990115 0100 - KANT-L digest 1158

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Von: Michael Scarpitti <MScarpit@asnt.org>
An: Multiple recipients of list <kant-l@bucknell.edu>
Betreff: RE: KANT-L digest 1158
Datum: Freitag, 15. Januar 1999 01:09

This discussion has been mistaken from the very start.
What Kant means by "objects conforming to us" is that they are In Space
and In Time. We cannot speak of objects other than as being In Space and
In Time. We cannot escape from our forms of sensibility, Space and Time,
(such as by the Ontological Argument, i.e., to "know" objects
atemporally) so if objects are not In Space and In Time we cannot know
them. If the objects "conform" to us, then we can "know" them. That's
really all there is to it.

Michael A Scarpitti
e-mail mscarpit@asnt.org

> ----------
> From:     Michael Joseph Welters
> Reply To:     kant-l@bucknell.edu
> Sent:     Thursday, January 14, 1999 11:22 PM
> To:     Multiple recipients of list
> Subject:     Re: KANT-L digest 1158
>
> Having read the discussions on options A or option B, I am having
> problems
> with both models. A few thoughts came to me this afternoon, which I
> will
> elaborate here, though they may quite easily be full of holes. Let me
> know.
>
> For an object to be a phenomenon (experiencable for us), it must
> cohere to
> our intuitions, concepts, etc. But does this mean objects cohere to
> our
> thoughts entirely? Let me use a picture frame analogy.
>
> Let us say that we have a picture frame with a glass pane, and that
> for an
> object to be in the phenomenonal realm, it must fit within the frame.
> Everything outside of the frame is not experienceable, as it does not
> fit
> within the frame (i.e., does not cohere to our intuitions and
> concepts).
> This means (in terms of the analogy) that the picture must fit within
> certain size limits, and must be 2-dimensional. In this respect, the
> object must cohere to us. But within the frame, our perceptions must
> cohere with the object. My perceptions cannot tell me that there is
> an
> airplane in the picture when there are two kids playing with a toy.
>
> In other words, once the object fits within our intuitions and
> concepts,
> then our thoughts must cohere to the object.
>
> Would this be an acceptable synthesis (excusing the roughness of the
> presentation), or am I completely off the wall?
>
>
>
> At 05:06 PM 13/01/99 -0500, you wrote:
> > Bob Binkley wrote:
> >
> >"And if the question is whether in acquiring knowledge we one of
> produce
> >the conformity by changing our beliefs or changing the objects, then
> surely
> >it is a matter of changing beliefs since we are powerless to change
> the
> >objects."
> >
> > I think the genius of Kant is evident from the simple fact
> >that, in response to Hume's scepticism, he recognised that
> >nature, in its phenomenal representation, *must* conform
> >to the legislative powers of reason, and it is indeed the object
> >that must *obey* and change according to the rules
> >enacted by the *observer*.
> >
> >In a dialogue with Paul Mathias in this list on May 28, 1997
> >I went into some detail to establish how and why this is the case.
> >Kant's discovery, of course, does not agree with George Boole's Laws
> of
> >Thought, which formulate our logical understanding of the nature.
> >>From the results of the poll it is clear that people have a great
> deal of
> difficulty
> >to grasp the essence of Kant's Copernican thesis. The use of
> >expressions such as * normal science* shows that Kant's
> >view poses a Monty Hallian problem for most people. The laws of
> probability
> >clearly determine the winning strategy for the Monty's game, and yet
> >most people (even after understanding these laws) continue to bet on
> the
> > wrong strategy, thinking that their intuition somehow would be
> correct.
> >
> >I would be very interested to see at least one example
> >in the so called *normal sciences* or any other possible place which
> could
> >validate the position A in which an *object* can defy its
> >oberver and can remain what it is supposed to *be*.
> >I suggest, *no* instances are possible.
> >
> >Best Regards
> >fN
>
> __________________________________________
>
> Michael Joseph Welters
> mwelters@sfu.ca
> "The philosophers have only _interpreted_ the world, in various ways;
> the
> point is to _change_ it." Karl Marx [1845], _Theses on Feuerbach_, XI.
>