Explanations and Reality

Thank you very much.

I first of all beg your pardon if I cannot speak to you in German. I am very grateful that you are all here listening to me. Once a daughter of my brother, when she was about 5 years old asked her mother: "Mother, were you waiting for me when I was born ?" and the mother said "Yes" and the little girl said "How wonderful. It is not nice to come to a place where one is not being expected!"

So, I am delighted, thank you very much [applause].

But in the same time it is very dangerous if you are too much expected; so, I hope, you do not expect me too much [brings blackboard near to public].

What I wish to do today is indeed handle this question about explanations and reality. But in the process I shall be speaking about us, human beings, living systems, myself. That is I shall be dealing with matters that matter to us because they are daily matters. Now, I do not know if I have become from a materialist ... have become an idealist; to some extent I think that under the question that I want to address, these two classificatory distinctions do not really apply. Because in the long run, what I want to reflect a little bit is about the fundaments of what we do as human beings, and I shall do this, reflecting on what we do as living beings, and particularly as human beings.

So it's human beings reflecting upon what human beings do. So I shall take continuously elements of daily life. I shall begin for example with two words of daily life. >may be it would be nice to have an erasor eventually ...<

Fig. 1

These two words are "lie" and "mistake" [see Fig. 1]. Now, these are very interesting words. Because they refer to experiences that occur in different times.

When you say that someone lies, or you claim that you lie, you say something that is happening in the moment to which you are referring. With "I'm lying" or "What I said was a lie" you are referring to the present, not to the instant, but to the present: "In the moment in which I said what I said I had all the elements to think that what I was saying was not correct, was false." And this is what one says, when he says "I'm lying" or "I lied". "I lied yesterday" means "Yesterday, when I said what I said I had all the elements to claim that what I was saying was not the case."

But the mistake is completely different. Because when you say "Yesterday I committed a mistake", what you are saying is "Yesterday when I said what I said I had all the elements to claim that what I said was correct."

So, the mistake that I committed yesterday I committed it today. Because in the moment in which one commits a mistake one does not commit a mistake. The mistake is always 'a posteriori'.

The lie, is in the moment, but the mistake is 'a posteriori'.

Now, this is a very interesting thing, because when somebody says "Excuse me, I committed a mistake, excuse me, it was an error." what this person is asking is not for the undoing of what was done, but for the acknowledgment of sincerity. Acknowledgment of sincerity, that the other person accepts that you were sincere in what you were doing and now you are also sincere in acknowledging, recognizing, that what you did then was inadequate. [4']

How comes that we commit mistakes? Now, that we commit mistakes is obvious, We are continuously begging forgiveness for mistakes.

How comes that one commits mistakes? We live in a world in which we move around and in relation to each others making assertions about reality, about knowledge, about truth, and we commit mistakes; and mistakes are 'a posteriori'; in the moment in which we do that which we claim afterwards "It was a mistake", we live it as valid. Not only that.

Whenever we say "We committed" or "I committed a mistake" one is saying also the following: "According to what I think now, to my experiences in this moment, that experience to which I refer as being a mistake, is not valid." So I correct this experience in terms of saying "It was a mistake" through reference to an experience now. And how do I know now, that what I am doing is not a mistake ? Because mistakes are not known in the moment, because if I know now, then I am lying.

So, mistakes are 'a posteriori', and not only they are 'a posteriori', mistakes are disqualifications, devaluations of experiences with reference to another experience, which is valid on what grounds ? On belief, on certainty, or perhaps through reference to another experience: this other experience claims that this is valid and since this is valid this other was not valid, so it was a mistake. But this other experience is valid on what grounds ? Some other experience; and so on, and so forth.

The same happens with these two words: "perception" and "illusion".

When we say "I see, I perceive it" anything around this means I claim, that I have captured that. Perception comes from latin 'percapìre'. I have captured it, it is there. So I am speaking in terms of my grasping something, that it is there and is valid in its being there.

And "illusion". The illusion is always 'a posteriori'. Is afterwards that you say "This was an illusion": "Hallo Peter, how wonderful that you are he.... Oh, excuse me sir, excuse me, it was an illusion".

But when you see your friend Peter you have all the body joyces of encountering Peter. And if you see an enemy, you go like this [he curves his back, rotates it away from the public and walks some steps] to avoid this enemy, with all the body feelings of seeing an enemy, and afterwards you say "Ouf..., it was an illusion". So, you had all this body dynamics for nothing.

But when you have it, you have it. So illusions, in the moment in which they are lived, are lived exactly the same like this [points to "perception"].

But the illusions are experiences of perception disqualified 'a posteriori' through reference to some other experience. How comes that we have illusions ?

* * *

Now it is about this that I wish to speak.

But as I speak about this, I wish to ask a question about how comes that it happens that we have illusions, that we commit mistakes, how happens that we operate as we operate, and how do we operate ? <Since there is no erasor, I turn this round [he turns the blackboard panel on the back side]>. [6']

I wish to ask a question and the question is about us observers observing. Hm? Some of you may have heard me speaking of this but it is the moment of doing it again. Observer observing [writes in Fig. 2, step (1)].

Now, who is observer observing ? Anyone of us.

In fact, the word observe, observing or observer means an operation of putting something independent from you and looking at it as independent from you. And this is what we do. At least we in our culture do it, continuously. So I am speaking about us human beings, and this happens to us now, as you listen to me, as you look at me, while we are living; because, ladies and gentlemen, you are alive!

It happens in the happening of living [writes in Fig.2 step (2)]. And it happens in the happening of living, in the process of living. In fact, in the moment when we stop living, we are not anymore able to operate as observers. If a metorite comes through the roof, fffft, hits my head, I fall to the ground, oh my goodness, the lecture is ended! We cannot know anything about observing now, because the observer is not living, so he is not operating as an observer. Happening of living in the praxis of living. In the doing of it.

But at the same time we distinguish ourselves doing what we do. Listening, observing, in experience. And by speaking about experience I refer to that which we distinguish as happening to us. I'm listening or I'm bored, I'm interested, I'm tired, oh my back! All these are distinctions of what happens to us in that moment. If I don't distinguish that my back akes, my back doesn't ake. Aha, when I distinguish I may say "Oh, it has been aking all this afternoon". And we know this. We have been doing things and suddenly we make a distinction that we extend to the past. But unless we make the distinction, nothing happens.

In language [writes in Fig. 2 step (3,4,5)].

So, the observer is us, human beeing in the happening of living in language, in the praxis of living in language, in experience in language.

And as we are ourself distinguishing ourselves or at least as we happen as observers in language we ask questions. Questions about whatever, questions about the observer, questions about the circumstances. A friend appears and you say "Hi, how did you come here ?", "Why are you here?", "What do you want ?" "Did you see this and that ?".

And we ask several kinds of questions. And among the questions that we ask we ask questions that beg for an explanation as an answer. Hm, I said, questions that beg, that demand as an answer an explanation.

"How did you come ?" "I am here"

"No, no, I am asking how did you come ?"

The person answers "I am here", this ..., I don't accept this answer, I want a different answer, a peculiar answer. An answer, that is an explanation of how this person came.

I shall refer to this kind of questions. And I shall refer by putting here [writes in Fig. 2 step (6)] explanation; now explanations are experiences of course, we find ourselves giving explanations: "Oh you don't have to explain!", "Oh, yes, excuse me, why am I explaining,...I should not have explained this,..." and it's obvious that this is legitimate.

So as I put explanations here, I am not claiming, that they are anything special but explanations. Experiences, answers to questions that accept as an answer an explanation. [5']

And what is the answer, that a question that demands an explanation accepts ? In other words: what answer do we accept when we make a question that demands an explanation as an answer ?

I claim, that if you listen to yourself in daily life, you will find out, that that which one wants to hear as an answer to a question in terms of demanding an explanation is a proposition which consists in a process or a mechanism that if it were to be allowed to operate will give as a consequence, as a result, the experience that you want to explain.

And by that I am saying: if there are planes, if one can take them and if they go to Frankfurt and if you survive the flight and then you get out into the train and then to the taxi you can be here. Yes, this is it.

"I don't believe you!"

Haa, interesting, isn't it !?

Because it means, that the answer to a question that demands an explanation as an answer must satisfy an additional condition. Must be a statement under the form of the proposition of a mechanism - of a process - which if you let it operate gives as a result of its operation the experience that you want to explain.

But must satisfy something else, something that you put in your listening.

And we have learned this since childhood. I remeber when I was a child - and may be for you the situation may have been different, but accept, I come form Chile, South America, very far away - when I was a child one could ask ones mother [puts his arms behinds his back, looks high above him]:

"Oh my dear child, you were brought from Europe by the stork."

But listen to this situation. The child asks for a question which begs an explanation as an answer ? And what does the mother answer ? A mechanism, a process. If there is such a place as Europe, and there are factories where babies are made, and if there are storks which can carry babies in their beeks and they can fly blam blam blam blam long enough and deposit the babies in front of the house of the lady that wants the child, then childs are born. And the child says: "Oh mother, how wonderful!" and accepts this.

But the child, a few days later, a week later, I do not know, sometime later may come to the mother and say:

"Mother, I don't believe this story of the stork."

"What do you mean you don't believe what I have told you ?"

And the mother, would say:

"Oh my child, you have grown up now, I can explain you,..." and begins to explain the whole story of the seeds, bla bla. And the child says: "Thank you mother" and goes away happy.

Notice, the first answer was accepted and the child was happy. Then was rejected and the second answer was accepted and the child was happy.

Is one of these answers more fantastic than the other ? Honestly not.

Not only they are not fantastic, they belong to the realm of experiences of the child, both of them! Because the child has seen birds, coming from very far away, small birds, bigger birds, birds carrying things in their beek when they make their nest, they carry little things, so he may even have seen bigger birds carrying something bigger. So a bird, coming from somewhere else beyond the horizon, carrying a baby is nothing fantstic, belongs to the domain of experiences of the child.

And the other answer, the babys made inside of the mother, well he has seen a mother, a woman with a big belly and has touched soething and felt something moving, so again this other answer is dealing with experiences of the child.

The child may even ask:

But you see, these questions of the child are comparable to the questions of the first answer. Why does the child prefer one answer or the other. I do not know exactly, but I know why I would have preferred the second one. I would have preferred the second one because it is more cosy, is more intimate, your relationship to your mother is more intimate.

But this shows to you, that it is not enough that the answer should have the proper form. Must satisfy some other elements in the listening. Hm, but this is telling something very interesting. This is telling us that an explanation is an interpersonal relation. Isn't that so ?

This is telling to you, that explanations are not in themselves, explanations are interpersonal relations!

And you are under these particular circumstancies exactly like the child, listening to what I say and accepting or rejecting what I say according to additional listenings that you have. Do my descriptions or answers or explanations satisfy the form that explanations must have ? Do they satisfy other characteristics that they might have and which I put in my listening ?

Ladies and gentlemen, the first thing I am telling to you is that explanations are not in themselves, explanations are manners of human relations. And this is not trivial.

Because we quarrel around explanations. [4']

In addition I would like to call attention to something that you know, explanations do not replace that which they explain. Because explanations tell you, if this and this and this happens, then this would be the result. So one should not fear, that an experience will be replaced by an explanation. Now, if one looses the fear that experiences may be replaced by explanations, means that one can explain anything, one has freedom to explain anything. One will not disappear if one is explained. Will consciousness disappear if consciousness is explained ? What happens with my consciousness if my consciousness is explained ?

Forget it, no problem.

But at the same time this means that there are as many kinds of explanations as there are kinds of listening. And this is very interesting too. There are as many kinds of explanations as kinds of listenings, these additional elements that one puts in the listening.

Scientific explanations are one of these. Scientific explanations are propositions of generative mechnisms that in addition to being generative mechanisms, must satisfy the participation in the coherent realization of four conditions. And I shall just spell this, I shall not go into every detail [see Fig. 3]

We scientists are concerned with specifying [writes in Fig.3] that which we want to explain. And what does one want to explain ? An experience. One speaks about a phenomenon but the phenomenon is an experience. And how do you refer to the experience you want to explain ? By saying, if you do this, this and that, then you have such an experience. This is what one wants to explain.

Two [writes in Fig. 3] so, experience. Generative mechanisms. If this and this and this happens, then this and this is the result. Generative mechanisms. You cannot read what I write, generative mechanisms. Of what ? Of the experience to be explained.

Then, the deduction. Very straight forward deduction of all the experiential coherences entailed in the domain in which you bring or you present these generative mechanisms. Deduction [writes in Fig.3]. And a deduction from all these operational or experiential coherences entailed in the generative mechanism, or in the domain in which the generative mechanism is presented, of other experiences that one would have if one were to do certain things that are also deduced. The child says "Oh mother, then if I go to Europe I can see the factories where the babies are made ?". It is a deduction that the child makes from the experiential coherences entailed in the statement: "You were brought here by the stork from Europe.".

And finally the realization [writes in Fig. 3] in your experience or in the experience of the observer, of what has been deduced. The child grows up, goes to Europe, marries an european woman and has a child.

When these four conditions are satisfied coherently, this [writes in Fig.3], point 2, becomes a scientific explanation.

Now, you can check this. Not what scientists say or philosophers say, but what scientists do. And you will find out that this is what scientists do. So, scientific explanations are generative mechanisms, presented in the context of the satisfaction of these four conditions. Which take place in the experience of the observer, under circumstances in which the observers commit mistakes. [5']

And mistakes are 'a posteriori'. And you cannot know, when you are committing a mistake, that you are committing a mistake. I say "Peter" and then immediately realize - this 'immediately' is not immediately, is not in the moment, is in relation to some other aspects of the flow of my experiences.

So, scientific explanations have the beauty of being propositions of generative mechanisms, that are coherent in the domain of experience of the observer in a particular manner. And the observer is a human being, a living being in language. So scientific explanations are coherent with human living. And this is not at all trivial.

This is here [?] the quality of transforming life that scientific explanations have - scientific explanations transform human life because have to do with changes of coherences of experiences in human life. They don't get us out from what we do in living.

Now, I wish to ask the question about the observer [writes in Fig. 2 the left '?']. And I shall make some reflections in relation to this, which will lead us to the question of reality.

One can ask "How comes, that I can do whatever I can do ?". And I claim that that question can be answered in a scientific explanation. I shall not say more about that, it is a claim, and I could show you but, not in this lecture.

But to do that, I have to accept the question. What happens if I do not accept the question ? You see, to accept the question, is to accept the listening for a generative mechanism. If you do not accept the question about something, and in this case the observer, you take the observer for granted. You take the abilities of the observer for granted. Precisely because you are not accepting the question. Or, if you are taking the abilities of the observer for granted, then you are not accepting the question.

And what does it mean, or what does it entail, taking the abilities of the observer for granted? Entails something very interesting. Entails that you take for granted your ability to make statements about things that are there independent from you. Because, if you do not take this ability for granted, you ask yourself "How comes that I can say that that is there independent from me ?". And then you have accepted the question. And then you have opened yourself for the proposition of some generative mechanism that will explain, how comes that you can say "That thing is there independent from me."

So, what we have here [writes in Fig. 2 step (6)], is two explanatory domains, or two explanatory avenues, which differ in what one does with respect to the question about the observer. And this is the fundamental thing: either you accept this question or you do not accept this question.

Ladies and gentlemen, I have no argument to convince or to force or to demand from anybody to accept this question. But I invite you to folllow with me the consequences of accepting and not accepting this question. Just as a game. [4']

[due to end of side A tape I have missed some words on my registration]

... when I accept my abilities as observer as given, my biology is not the source of them. My biology is an instrument of expression of my fundamental consciousness, my fundamental rational capacity, whatever. My bodyhood is a vessel that contains ... my mind, my consciousness, whatever.

When one does not accept the question and one operates under this implicit assumption, that one can make reference about things which are there independent from oneself, one claims that the explanations that one proposes are ultimately validated by the thing-ness of that thing, there, independently from me. The universality of some true statement lies in its objectivity. And I call this the explanatory path of objectivity [writes in Fig.2 step (7)].

And we hear daily: "Oh, I am objective! Be realistic ! Be objective !". And what is one saying ? What one is saying is "I have a priviledged access about how things are, so you have to do as I say." Hm?

"Be objective!" means "Do as I say!",

"Be realistic!" means "Do as I say!".

"You are not realistic!" means "Do as I say!",

"You are not objective!" means "Do as I say!".

So there is in this explanatory path, as one does not accept the question about the observer, the implicit, unaware assumption, that one can make reference to something that exists independently from oneself - whether [?] one can know it fully or not - that validate eventually what one says. And this is reality [writes in Fig.2 step (8)]. Reality, truth, whatever it is. But is independent from us. Universal, because it is independent from us. Is valid for everybody, because it is independent from us.

Now, if I accept the question, then I have to accept that in the experience I cannot distinguish between perception and illusion. That the distinction is 'a posteriori'. I have to accept, or I do accept, that my abilities as an observer are the result of something. What ? Well, I begin to investigate. Hit speakers and find out, that when they die, they cannot speak anymore. And discover that [it] has to do with the biology. But in this case the biology is not a container, is the condition of possibility.

I red once an article called 'The limitations of the eye for seeing'. Now, this title means, seeing is a process which is being limited by the eye. Seeing is not constituted in what happens with the organisms through eyes. Is being limited by the eye. That article was written in this [points to left] explanatory path.

Now, if you accept the question for the observer, then what you are accepting is, in fact all questions, all questions become legitimate. There are no more tabus about questions anymore.

And this is a fantastic thing!

To find oneself that all ..., that one is in a world of living, in a manner of living in which all questions are legitimate. Listen a little bit to our daily life. We are continuously putting barriers, dening possible questions, and we are dening possible questions precisely by not accepting the question about the observer.

If we accept this questions we can ask about language, about experience, about explanation, about knowledge, about whatever. About soul, mind, and we are accepting the task of proposing some generative mechanism. [5']

But as we do that, then we realize something which is very interesting: that indeed we validate our explanations with our doings. That we explain experience with experience, not with reference to something independent from us. That we in our operation are the source of validation of what we say.

And this is a very interesting thing. But what is interesting is that we become aware of this. I call this explanatory path "objectivity in parenthesis" [writes in Fig. 2 step (9)].

Now, I am not doing an 'epoché', like Husserl; I am saying, with this parenthesis: "We become aware". This parenthesis means AWARENESS. I am aware that I have no way of making reference to anything independent from me to validate my explaining and that my explaining is validated through my coherences of experience as I put here when I put this scientific explanation. Which we do in daily life as well, we don't have to be scientists to operate with the criterion of validation of scientific explanations. In fact, the criterion of validation of scientific explanations is a refinement of daily life criteria for validation of explanations.

But as we accept the question about the observer and we realize that we explain experience with experience, then we discover that there are many domains of explanations, which have to do with the different coherences of the experiences that we live.

That each domain of coherent experiences is a domain of explanations. We can use experiences to explain experiences in that domain. And each one of these domains is lived as a domain of objects, as a domain of reality. So we have here many realities [writes in Fig. 2 step (10)]. Notice, that in terms of the real, what we have here, this explanatory system in which we use the elements, the relations, the entities that arise in the coherences of experience, explain experience.

And as we see all this, we realize, we become aware that that of which we speak when we speak of reality in this [points to left] explanatory path is an explanatory argument.

Ladies and gentlemen, "Realität" is an explanatory argument!

I don't make the distinction between "Realität" and "Wirklichkeit". Reality is an explanatory argument in the same term, if you wish, in which Gregory Bateson answered to his daughter in one of his 'Metalogues', when his daughter said "Father, what is an instinct ?' and Gregory Bateson said "An explanatory argument". "What does it explain ?". "Everything !".

"What does reality explain ?". "Everything !".

And these [points to right], of course these are explanatory arguments as well, these are domains of explanations, but I am aware of that, I don't pretend here, that I can have an access to this [points to left].

So, this discussion about constructivism and reality, in fact, is a discussion about awareness.

Are we aware or not, that we have no way of making reference to something independent from us, because we cannot distinguish as living systems between perception and illusion ?

And not only us. No living system can distinguish between perception and illusion. No machine can distinguish between perception and illusion. [5']

Ladies and gentlemen, if you have a taperecorder, and you press with the finger, you trigger the operation of the tape recorder. If you press with your nose you trigger - in film they make this, hm, you are tight here [puts his hands on the back], so you press with your nose. The machine makes no distinction about what you see different as the finger and the nose. The machine does not distinguish between what we call perception and illusion.

What is here [right] then the distinction between perception and illusion ? It is very simple. If somebody makes a statement in this domain of reality, and you listen at this in this other domain of reality, then you claim, that that is an illusion, that that is a mistake.

But we do that, ladies and gentlemen, this is our daily life! I am dealing with daily life! In fact I think that it is through explaining daily life that we can explain technical life. I say, chemistry is a bubble of cooking, biology is a bubble of taking care of chicken, philosophy is a bubble of answering questions of children. But listen, questions of children are honest questions. This is why philosophy is of interest.

And what I am saying, where does it belong ? Here [right] of course.

What gives validity to what I am saying ? The operations that come with accepting the question about the observer. I am not telling you the truth. I am not speaking about reality. In fact, it has no sense speaking about reality in these [right] terms, once you have accepted the question about the observer. Of course if you do not accept the question, you speak as if that which you do were validated through something independent from you. And this question has been around us from 2000 years or little more.

Sometime in the early fourties, a distinguished british scientist made an ...- a physiologist in fact, Cray was his family name, I don't remember the first name - ... wrote a little book about explanations, and he deals with this situation, this indistinguishability between perception and illusion, and he says "But, if there were no reality, then everything would be a chaos ! So we have to accept the real !".

Ladies and gentlemen, don't be afraid....

You have been living without ever being able to make reference to something independent from you and no chaos, although we can generate chaos too.

Because, what happens here, is that we discover something that we do in daily life: that that which we live is constituted by our living together. Now somebody said yesterday in one of the meetings, that this was a very well known thing, from long long history, and it is true.

The only thing I am doing, is inviting you to take it seriously. And giving grounds to you to take it seriously.

Because in daily life we also ask the question "How do you know ?".

And this is an interesting question, "How do you know ?". Somebody makes a statement, I, for example, and you can ask "How do you know ?" [writes in Fig. 2 right '?']. And what are you asking for ? A generative mechanism that validate knowledge. Asking for a criterion of acceptability [validity]. [5']

And of course, you can answer the criterion of acceptability [validity] in these terms [left], but usually innocent people do not accept this easily. Children do not accept that all this was done by god. "God, mother, what is God ? How does God do it ?". The questions go on. Because the child wants an answer in his or her domain of experiences. An answer that puts you away from your domain of experiences, for an honest innocent questioner is not understandable. Requires an act of faith. But if you are honest in your answer you will always provide an answer in the operational domains of experience.

So, what we have here, is the possibility for understanding conditions of constitution of that which we bring about in our distinctions. Explanations, objects, entities, relations. "How do you know ?", and then you produce, what ?, an operationality in some aspect of your experiential domain. Hm?, in some domain of reality. Physics: oh, you operate with operations that define distance, time, and mass, and you get physics. Biology: you operate with some operations that constitute such and such distinctions of operations of living systems. Whatever it is. Experiential domain. Not experiences of reality, experiential domain. coherences within experience.

I disagree with Popper, when he says that we scientists go through falsification and that falsification somehow has to do with reality. We scientists do not follow the path of falsification, we follow the path of validation, through the criteria of validation of scientific explanation. I call this explanatory path [left] the 'domain of transcendental ontology', the domain of beings, of essences which are transcendental, which are independent from the observer.

And I call this explanatory path [right], the 'domain of constitutive ontologies', the domain in which we attend to the conditions of constitution of that which we talk about. And I shall end by a few reflections about what this means, this awareness, in daily life.

It means that we are aware, or we can become aware through this reflection - notice if I do not accept the question for the observer, I remain here [left], I cannot make the whole reflection that I have made here [right], precisely because this reflection arises from accepting the question about the observer. But once I accept this question, then I see this whole dynamics. I see that what is involved here in an analysis, an epistemological analysis of knowing, of explaining, is human relations. Epistemology has to do with human relations. And in a way I am not the first who said it, Gregory Bateson said it when he spoke about epistemology. But then we become aware, that statements in 'objectivity without parenthesis' there are demands for obedience. "I am objective, you must do as I say !".

While here [right] a statement is valid in the domain of reality in which it is valid. Listen for in another domain of reality is an illusion. So whenever somebody makes a statement, he is making an invitation to reflect in a particular domain of reality. It is not a demand for obedience. Is an invitation to participate in something. "Oh, you are speaking of euclidean geometry, phantastic, I was speaking in Riemann geometry". "Oh you are speaking in physics, I am speaking in biology. Let us go to have coffee together.". [6']

Could I say easily "Let us go to have coffee together" here [left], well it is not so easy. It is not so easy, because there is a demand for obedience. "The observer is a physical entity!", "The observer is a biological entity!", "Oh, physics is the fundamental science !", "Biology is the fundamental science! We cannot have coffee together."

For having coffee together, we must respect each other. And to respect each other, we cannot claim obedience one from the other.

A demand for obedience is always a denial of the other, is a lack of respect.

And we cannot respect the other, if we know that the other is mistaken. And we know that the other is mistaken, because we know, how things really are.

While in this explanatory path [right], well the other really is not mistaken, is in another domain. Oh, may be he has committed a logical mistake in applying the coherences of this domain. But, whenever you commit a logical mistake - you say "Two by two equals five", and somebody tells you "No, no, no, no, two by two equals four. Look, this is the operation that constitutes multiplication, and if you perform this operation, what you get is four." "Oh, my goodness, silly of me! Let us go and have coffee together." No problem.

In 1973 I was in Chile and this was practically on the eve [vigil], just a day before the military coup. And the country was divided in two, by the middle. Well, there were many discussions. And we knew that something was going to happen, but we went to discussions. And I remember I was in a meeting, just a day before, in which there was a very heated argumentation for socialism and for not socialism and so on and so forth. And, at the end I approached one of these persons and I said "Oh, perhaps we can talk about these matters." He said "Yes, I am interested.", and I said "But let us talk in a way in which we allow for the possibility of being changed through the conversation." And then he said "Excuse me, I have no time."

What does this mean ? Hm ?

It means, that when you own the truth, you cannot reflect upon it, because you own it. You have this access about reality, and to reflect upon it means that you have the possibility to look at it and loose it.

And this is not an easy matter.

But here [right], you have no problem. You do not own the truth. You know that something that you say is valid within a particular domain of coherences. Because there are certain operations that constitute its validity. And for that you can commit mistakes in the application of the operations, nothing more.

But here [left] whenever you are invited to reflect on the fundaments of validity of what you say, precisely because you own the truth, you own reality, you do not reflect on how comes that you know it, you reject it.

And this is why there are two kinds of discussions. Those which have to do with logical mistakes, and these are trivial. And those which have to do with the fundaments that give validity to the system of coherences in which your statement is valid and if you are here, in this explanatory path, in 'objectivity without parenthesis' then those discussions have no end, because one does not look to the fundaments. Religious discussions are of this kind. Ideological discussions are of this kind. No end. [6']

So ladies and gentlemen, I shall end by adding the following. We in daily life do these two things in different moments. And we operate in one or other of these two explanatory paths according to how we stand in relation to the others. According to our emotioning [writes in Fig. 2 step (11)].

With friends, we are here, in the explanatory path of 'objectivity in parenthesis'. Friendship is constituted in the absence of demands for obedience. As soon as you demand obedience from a friend, friendship has come to an end. In friendship you accept the legitimacy of the friend. You are open to listening in what domain of reality the other is.

Here in this explanatory path [left] you are when you want - awarely or not - to deny the other, when you want the other to do as you say. And then you want an argument, that the other will not be able to deny. Reality becomes an argument to force the other, to compell the other, to do as you say!

And we move in this in daily life.

So I end by saying that, these reflections about the question of reality are not trivial, because indeed they have to do with ethics. And ethics has to do with our seeing or not seeing the other as a legitimate other in coexistence with ourselves.

Because, when you demand obedience, you deny the other. So, the other does not arise as a legitimate other in coexistence with you. Is being denied.

We confuse these things under discussions of power. We frequently talk about power. For example, let us imagine a daily life situation. You come to the house of a friend,and this friend is a lady, and says to her child: "Peter, go please to the sleeping room and bring my [basket]". "And the child says "Yes mother", goes and brings it. And the friend says "Oh, you have an obedient child." It is not true, that child did not obey, that child cooperated.

But if your friend says "Peter, go and bring the [basket] that is in the bedroom", "Oh, mother I am playing", "Peter, go and bring the [basket] that is in the bedroom", "Oh mother, yea, I shaaall gooo ...". Then your friend can say "You have an obedient child" because that is obedience. You obey, when you do something that somebody else demands under circumsances that you would not do it, but you want to conserve something else by doing it.

And we speak about power in both cisrcumstances. In the first case there is no power relation. In cooperation there is no power relation. Power is constituted in obedience. But we do not understand that, if we do not understand what is involved in human relations in the validation of our statements.

So I finish - and that of course, it is a matter of ethics -, so I finish saying that, I propose to listen to the consequences of realizing that reality is an explanatory argument, that is used under certain particular manners of human relations. That if one is aware of that, then one can use the notion of reality by looking at the conditions which make that which one claims to be real, valid.

And I invite you to do this, dream with it, play with it - if you don't like it, throw it to the basket, I mean - because I believe, that you will have a good time with those reflections. Thank you very much. [6']